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Rosen: Constitutional Law--Elections--Is There a Constitutional Right to

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-ELECTIONS-IS THERE A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
TO CHANGE PARTIES?
I.

INTRODUCTION

As the political agitation, unrest, and tumult of the
1960's increased, the American system of government responded in a variety of ways, one of which was an increased
interest in the fairness of the election process. The Congress
enacted the Voting Rights Act of 19651 in an effort to enforce
equality for racial minorities in the election process. The
United States Supreme Court began to hand down decisions
which also sought to expand the freedom of the ballot, most
2
dramatically in the "one-man, one-vote" cases, Baker V. Carr
3
and Reynolds v. Sims. The legislative response concentrated
particularly on the serious problem of dilution of minority
groups' votes by changes made by the State in the election
procedure. 4 Thus, the Voting Rights Act prevents certain
groups from voting-where their voting tends to dilute the
voting strength of others. (A quick annexation to dilute the
voting strength of inner city blacks may be unlawful under
the Act, for example.) The judicial response concentrated on
the problem of equal protection, and increasingthe participation of otherwise excluded groups. Thus, whereas one of the
aims of the Voting Rights Act is prevention of vote dilution,
the judicial constitutional decisions aim at broadening the
right to vote. A useful oversimplification would be that the
legislative design (in one section of the Voting Rights Act)
has the effect of narrowing the group of legitimate voters,
whereas the judicial design has the effect of broadening the
group.
These two streams of federal enforcement of federally
protected rights flowed side by side with little apparent
inconsistency until they met in a Charleston, South Carolina
tempest called the City Democratic Primary, held on June
8, 1971. The difficulties centered on a set of ambiguous South
1. 42 U.S.C. §1973 (1971).

2. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
3. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).

4. 42 U.S.C. §1973(c) (1971).
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Carolina election laws, particularly one statute, which prescribed an oath to be taken by each voter, which had the effect
of preventing him from changing parties for one year. 5 A
special three-judge District Court held, per curiam, that primary elections were no diffrent from other elections and
that the oath prescribed by state statute requiring each voter
to swear that he had not voted "in any other party's primary
election ... held this year" was unconstitutional because no
"compelling state interest" could justify it. Gordon v. Executive Committee.03
II.

BACKGROUND

After the death of Congressman L. Mendel Rivers,
Republican and Democratic primary elections were held to
nominate candidates for the special election to the United
States House of Representatives from the First Congressional
District of South Carolina. The Republican primary for the
congressional race was held on February 20, 1971. Later that
year, on June 8, 1971, a Democratic party primary election
was held in the City of Charleston to nominate candidates for
the offices of Mayor and Aldermen. A political and legal
quarrel arose between the two Democratic candidates for
Mayor, William Ackerman and J. Palmer Gaillard, Jr., as to
whether those persons who had voted in the February 20
Republican primary for Congress were entitled to vote in the
June 8 Democratic primary for Mayor. The controversy grew
out of the election laws of the State of South Carolina. The
Ackerman faction contended that the law required the voters
to take the following oath as a prerequisite to voting:
I do solemnly swear or affirm that I am duly qualified to vote at
this primary election and in this club, and that I have not voted before
at this primary election or in any other party's primary election, convention, or precinct meeting held this year.7

Thus, those voting in the Republican primary for Congress
in February would not be able to vote in the Democratic pri5. "The managers at each box shall require every voter to take the following additional oath and pledge: 'I do solemnly swear or affirm that I am
duly qualified to vote at this primary election and in this club, and that I have
not voted before at this primary election or in any other party's primary election,
convention, or precinct meeting held this year." 23 S.C. CODE ANN. §400.71
(Supp. 1970).
6. 335 F. Supp. 166 (D.S.C. 1971).
7. 23 S.C. CODE ANN. §400.71 (Supp. 1970).
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mary for Mayor in June. The Executive Committee of the
Democratic Party of the City of Charleston disagreed with
this contention.
The position of the Executive Committee in regard to the
oath was expressed in a resolution passed by that body prior
to the primary election in June. The resolution stated that
Section 57 of Title 47 of the South Carolina Code8 provides
that municipal primaries shall be conducted pursuant to the
South Carolina Election Law (Title 23 of the Code), unless
the Uniform Municipal Election Law is adopted by a municipality. This uniform law, not having been adopted by the
City of Charleston, the South Carolina Election Law is applicable. The Election Law applies, however, to state and
county elections, and is applicable to municipal elections only
by virtue of Title 47 (Municipal Corporations), "it being necessary... to apply the provisions of said election law [Title
23] mutatis mutandis9 so that same will have the same effect
on municipal elections as on County and State elections." 10
Thus, under the Executive Committee's interpretation, Section
400.71 of Title 23 of the 1962 South Carolina Code, the oath
section, should be read mutatis mutandis. That is, the oath
requires "that a voter must not have voted in any other municipal party's primary election, convention or precinct meeting
held this year."' 1
The Attorney General of South Carolina stated in an
opinion dated May 27, 1971 that "those individuals who participated in the Republican Congressional Primary election...
are not eligible to vote in the Municipal Primary Election of
the Democratic Party of the City of Charleston . . .,,12 The
Executive Committee, disagreeing with the Attorney General's
8. This section provides that "Municipal primary, general and special
elections in South Carolina shall be conducted pursuant to the South Carolina
Election Law, except as otherwise provided in Title 47, as amended, and the
provisions of this article if same are adopted and made applicable within the
municipality as hereinafter provided."
9. "With the necessary changes in points of detail, meaning that matters
or things are generally the same, but to be altered when necessary as to names,
offices, and the like." Black's Law Dictionary (4th Ed. 1968).
10. Resolution of the Executive Committee of the Democratic Party of

the City of Charleston, on file with the Board of State Canvassers of Municipal
Primaries, State Headquarters of the South Carolina Democratic Party.
11. Id. Emphasis added.
12. Letter from the Attorney General, Daniel McLeod, to James M. Condon and Arnold S. Goodstein, May 27, 1971.
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conclusions of law, published a notice "to all registered electors" urging them to vote, warning that they might be challenged at the polls, and citing the Attorney General's statement
that the challenge procedure was "the appropriate means of
preserving the rights of all persons in this heated controversy."13
Seven hundred and forty-four persons who had voted in
the February 20 Republican primary for Congress voted in
the Democratic primary for Mayor. 14 As the court phrased it,
"The election was close enough that, if the votes under attack
had been disregarded, the result could have been changed."'15
Three days of testimony were taken by the Executive
Committee after the election. Candidate Gaillard was certified
the winner. Those votes challenged as invalid by the Ackerman faction because the voters had voted in the Republican
primary were counted. An appeal was taken by the Ackerman
faction to the Board of State Canvassers of Municipal Primaries. The appeal was heard before the Board on July 6,
1971, and that body certified the Executive Committee's find16
ings.
A suit was then filed by Flossie Gordon and Lucille Morris, registered voters of the City of Charleston, alleging that
the Executive Committee had failed to comply with the requirements of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965
by altering the provisions of Title 23 of the South Carolina
Code. The three-judge Court was convened pursuant to Section 5.17
III.

FEDERAL PROTECTION OF THE VOTE: TWO TESTS

A.

The Voting Rights Act Test: Was There A Change
In Procedure?
The plaintiff-voters contended that their votes had been
diluted by the action of the Executive Committee. The Complaint stated:
13. The News and Courier, June 1-8, 1971.
14. 492 were challenged. 252 were not challenged. Gordon v. Executive
Committee, 335 F. Supp. 166, 168 (D.S.C. 1971).
15. Id.
,16. In Re: Appeal of William Ackerman, on file with the Board of State
Canvassers of Municipal Primaries, State Headquarters of the South Carolina
Democratic Party.

17. "Any action under this section shall be heard and determined by a
court of three judges in accordance with the provisions of section 2284 of Title
28 and any appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court." 42 U.S.C. 1973(c) (1971).
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... The purpose and effect of the changes was to manipulate the composition of the electorate to debase and dilute the effectiveness of Plain8
tiffs' votes and the votes of black electors represented by Plaintiffs.'

The Complaint relied on the Voting Rights Act for relief.1 9
The Court, of course, was convened only because of the provisions of that Act. Thus, the single issue posed was whether
or not the Democratic Party administered "any voting . . .
procedure ... different from that in force or effect 2on No-

vember 1, 1964"-the standard imposed by Section

5. 0

18. "Complaint for Injunction & Declaratory Relief," C.A. #71-852, in the
United States District Court, District of South Carolina, Charleston Division."
19. Id. The Complaint alleges, in part, that:
... The State of South Carolina and its subdivisions are subject
to the requirements of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C., Section
1973b, one of the provisions of that act forbids any change in
voting laws unless pursuant to 42 U.S.C., Section 1973. Defendant Executive Committee has not obtained a declaratory
judgement in the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia that the change in qualification, prerequisites,
standard, practice, or procedure to the Attorney General of the
United States to allow the Attorney General to offer any objections within sixty days. ? ? [Sic.]
. . . Defendant Executive Committee's refusal to comply with
the above laws stated in Paragraph 10 constituted a change in
voting laws within the meaning of 42 U.S.C., Section 1973c.
. . . None of the changes alleged herein was cleared in the
manner required in 42 U.S.C., Section 1973c.
. . . The purpose and effect of the changes was to manipulate
the composition of the electorate to debase and dilute the effectiveness of Plaintiffs' votes and the votes of black electors represented Plaintiffs.
20. Whenever a State or political subdivision with respect to which the
prohibitions set forth in section 1973b(a) of this title are in effect shall enact
or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or
standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in
force or effect on November 1, 1964, such State or subdivision may institute
an action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for
a declaratory judgment that such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice,
or procedure does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying
or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, and unless and until
the court enters such judgment no person shall be denied the right to vote for
failure to comply with such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or
procedure: Provided, That such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or
procedure may be enforced without such proceeding if the qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure has been submitted by the chief legal
officer or other appropriate official of such State or subdivision to the Attorney
General and the Attorney General has not interposed an objection within sixty
days after such submission, except that neither the Attorney General's failure
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The Court saw two potential changes in procedure: one,
administrative and two, statutory. In the first category,
administrative, there was no change by the Executive Committee from the interpretation given Section 23-400.71 in the
February Democratic Primary for Congress:
All that was ruled there [in the special congressional election in February] was that one who had voted in a primary of one party could
not participate in the primary of another party held to select the
nominee in the same general election. That was exactly the construction
given Section 23-400.71 by the City Executive Committee in connection
21
with the primary election involved in this proceeding.

In the second category, statutory, there was obviously
a change in the application of Section 23-400.71 to the election
procedure:
It is clear from the express language of the statute that the ruling of

the Executive Committee was violative
which purported to disqualify the voter
of the ballot in the Democratic primary
in the primary of another party within

of that part of this Statute
from exercising his freedom
merely because he had voted
one year. 22

In other words, the Committee had made a change in the
application of the laws' express provisions (though this interpretation of the statute had been used previously-in February). A strict use of the Voting Rights Act Test, with no
other considerations, might have led the Court to rule in favor
of the plaintiff-voters. The Court, then, would have had to
order a new election. But the Voting Rights Act Test is only
one test of freedom of the ballot. The court was obliged to
apply another test, the constitutional test, which, in a sense,
overshadows the Voting Rights Act Test.
B.

The Kramer Test: Is There A
"Compelling State Interest"?

The court found that there had been a change in procedure, but that this change was mandated by the constitutional
suspicion of durational requirements for voting, that is, the
Executive Committee would have been acting unconstituto object nor a declaratory judgment entered under this section shall bar a subsequent action to enjoin enforcement of such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure. 42 U.S.C. 1973(c) (1971). Section 23-400.71 of the

South Carolina Code was adopted prior to November 1, 1964.
21. Gordon v. Executive Committee, 335 F. Supp. 166, 169 (D.S.C. 1971).
22. Id. at 168. (Emphasis added).
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tionally if it had enforced the Section 23-400.71 oath which
enforced a time limit on what the court found to be the voter's
right to change parties. 23 Thus, the constitutional test, or
Kramer Test, came into direct conflict with the legislative
test, or Voting Rights Act Test, and the court opted for the
former.
In Kramer v. Union School District,24 the United States
Supreme Court held that the State of New York could not
limit the franchise in school district elections to owners (or
lessees) of taxable realty, and parents (or guardians) of
children in public schools, the two distinct groups enfranchised under the New York election laws. To so limit the
franchise would deny equal protection to those persons excluded. The court said, relying heavily on the import of the
"one-man, one-vote" decisions, that Reynolds

V.

Sims25 had

laid down the rule that statutes limiting the right to vote
"must be carefully and meticulously scrutizied. ' 28 Statutes
diluting the vote are strictly scrutinized, but "[n] o less rigid
an examination is applicable to statutes denying the franchise
to citizens who are otherwise qualified by residence and
age."' 27 Kramer rejected-for election cases-the long estab-

lished rule that a statute does not deny equal protection if it is
"'rationally related" to a legitimate governmental objective in
28
favor of a much stricter standard for election statutes, that

standard being "whether the exclusion [of voters] is necessary
29
to promote a compelling state interest."
Kramer applied the new standard to elections for school
board officials. The standard was applied to election on
23. The wording of the oath ("I have not voted ... in any other party's
primary election ... this year") if enforced, prevents the voter from changing
his party affiliation for one year. Thus a voter who becomes disenchanted with
party A a few months after he votes in party A's primary cannot vote in party

B's primary for the remainder of the year. This, in effect, limits the voter's
right to vote.
24. 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
25. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
26. Id., at 562.
27. Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U.S. 621 at 626 (1969).
28. Id., at 627-8.
29. Id., at 636.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

7

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 6
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24

revenue bonds in Ciprianov. City of Houma3o and to elections
31
on general obligation bonds in Phoenix v. Kolodziejski.
The lower federal courts were promptly faced with novel
constitutional questions involving the new Kramer standard,
mainly durational residency requirements for voter registration. Did a voter have to live in a state for six months before
he could vote? In Affeldt v. Whitcomb3 2 a three-judge District
Court found Indiana's six-month durational residency requirement for voter registration unconstitutional under the Kramer
test.33 Similar results were reached in Burg v. Canniffe34 and
Blumstein v.Ellington.3 5
The court in the present case brings primary elections
under the same Kramer umbrella as school board elections,
bond elections, and durational residency requirements for
voter registration. Certainly the South Carolina statute
"denies the franchise" to those of one party in another party's
primary. The questions posed are: Who is in which party?
Can a voter be prevented from voting in Party A's primary
just because he voted in Party B's primary to select a nominee
for a different office within the past year? Is a primary
analagous to a general election and to voter registration?
If it is, is there a "compelling state interest" in "locking" a
voter into a party for any period of time at all?
30. 395 U.S. 701 (1969). The court held that provisions of a Louisiana
statute which gave only "property taxpayers" the right to vote in elections to
approve the issuance of revenue bonds by a municipal utility was unconstitutional
as denying equal protection.
31. 399 U.S. 204 (1970).
32. 319 F. Supp. 69 (D.C. Ind. 1970).
33. "Although Indiana unquestionably has the power to impose reasonable residence restrictions on the availability of the ballot ... that power does
not encompass the imposition of standards which are discriminatory and inconsistent with the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth amendment..
Id., at 73.
"The standard by which the six months durational residency requirement
must be scruntinized is the so-called 'compelling interest' test" Id., at 74.
34. 315 F. Supp. 380 (D. Mass. 1970).
35. Civil No. 5815 M.D. Tenn., Aug. 31, 1970. For a fuller discussion of
the durational residency requirement, see Comment, Constitutional Law-Elections-Durational Residency Requirement, 23 S.C.L. R.v. 320 (1971).
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CAN THE PRIMARY BE SUBJECTED TO THE KRAMER TEST?

A.

The Primary Before Kramer

The primary election in American politics was a response
to the corruption of party caucauses and conventions. There
is no constitutional right to nominate. It is a "political
privilege, which may be regulated by the legislature" in the
exercise of the police power.8 6 The state is free to regulate
elections and limit the electorate-within constitutional boun3
daries. 7
The primary election comes under federal supervision
where federal rights are violated. Smith v. Allwright 38 firmly
established the principle that primaries were an integral part
of the election process and that parties could not claim to be
"private clubs," but were, in fact, agents of the state. The
South Carolina white Democratic primary was ruled illegal
under the Smith reasoning.3 9 Thus, parties cannot prevent a
voter from voting because of race.
The question posed in Gordon, though, is not discrimination on the basis of race; it is whether the state can require a
voter to show some degree of party loyalty in order to protect
the integrity of the primary. The legislature, ordinarily, can
define membership in a party.40 Thus, "a voter who is a
member of one political party may be excluded from partici-

pating in the party primaries of other parties

.

. .",41

The

purpose of such legislation is to prevent members of one party
from "raiding" the primary of another party. "It has consistently been held that any reasonable test
of party affilia42
tion may be required by the legislature."
A Maryland case, Hennegan v. Geartner,4 3 held that a
statute prohibiting a voter from changing his registered party
36. 25 Am. Jua2d Elections §129 (1966).

37. Id., §152.
38. 321 U.S. 649 (1943).
39. See Rice v. Elmore, 165 F. 2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947) and Brown v.
Baskin, 78 F. Supp. 933 (D.S.C. 1948).
40. 25 Amr. Jun. 2d Election.s §159 (1966).

41. Id.
42. "Various means of testing party affiliation are employed, the simplest
being a denial of the right to vote at a party primary election unless the applicant voted at the last general election with the political party holding such
primary election. .. ." Id.

43. 186 Md. 551, 47 A2d 393 (1946).
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affiliation within six months of a primary election was constitutional. 44 Of course, in Maryland, there was a system of
party registration. 45 Previous to Kramer, the general rule

that primaries could be reasonably regulated by durational
requirements for voting went unchallengd. Kramer and its
progeny have now produced, for the first time, a direct con-

stitutional attack on durational requirements for voting in
primaries.
B.

Does Kramer Apply To Primaries?

The court in Gordon reasoned as follows:
Voting is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society
which is preservative of all rights ....
For this reason, the trend of
recent decisions, with few exceptions, affirms that durational residential
requirements of one year, or even six months, as a prerequisite for
voting, are unconstitutional limitations upon a citizen's right of suffrage.
Such limitations must have a "sound or compelling purpose" to meet
the constitutional test.... We can perceive no basic difference between
a durational residence restriction and one which, using a like durational
standard, bases the restriction upon the manner in which one had previously voted. No sound or compelling purpose can possibly justify
"locking" a citizen into a party and denying him for a full year freedom
to change parties. Such an arbitrary restraint upon the voter is both
46
unreasonable and unconstitutional.

Put simply, the court, using the Kramer standard, put the
burden of justifying the durational requirement on the state

and in this case the court could find no compelling reason
why a voter should be "locked" into a party for a full year.

The court's opinion did not discuss the problem of one
party "raiding" (or crossing over into) another party's primary, 47 yet apparently this is what the statute was designed
44. "The direct primary is a creature of the Legislature, designed for the
purpose of permitting the members of a party to select their candidates under
official supervision and control. . . . The Legislature is not classifying voters.
It is exercising its inherent power to safeguard elections, and is regulating
elections as it is authorized by the [Maryland] Constitution. There is no
fundamental right in any voter to participate in the primaries or conventions of
parties other than the one to which he belongs." Id., at 553, 47 A.2d at 396.
45. Whereas in South Carolina there is no registration by party.
46. Gordon v. Executive Committee, 335 F. Supp. 166, 168 (D.S.C. 1971).
47. For example, only one candidate files for election in party A's primary
election. The filing date has passed for party A's primary. Members of party
A, realizing their candidate is automatically nominated, vote in party B's primary for the weakest candidate. Where one party is much stronger than
another party, it might send forth its "extra" votes' (especially where there is
a "political machine") to swamp viable candidates in the weaker party.
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to prevent. Presumably, under the statute, those who voted in
any party's primary could not then vote in another party's
primary for any office for one year. It is debatable whether
this provision had any real effect on party raiding because,
ordinarily, primaries for different major offices are separated by more than one year.48 Thus, even under the protection of the statute, a voter could vote in a Democratic
primary for Mayor in June, 1971 and still vote in a Republican primary for Congress in July, 1972. More importantly,
the state does not enforce the provision. It is the duty of the
candidates' poll watchers to challenge voters whom they suspect have voted in other primaries. 4 9 On the other hand, the
statute has been credited by some with preventing defections
in one election because the voters in question may wish to
vote in a particular primary election in the near future. For
example, black voters in the First Congressional District
might well have not supported a Republican in the Congressional race because they did not wish to be challenged in the
Democratic primary for Mayor of the City of Charleston.
The court was careful to point out that the offending
section of the statute did not negate the entire statute. 50 The
intent of the statute, according to the court, "was to prevent
a voter from participating in nominating primaries of two
parties in the same election," 51 the same result reached, in a
different fashion, by the Executive Committee. Hence, the
court left a minimum protection. A voter must still choose a
party for at least one election. He can only vote in one primary
48. Congressman Rivers's death began a chain of events unlikely to recur

in a century: Mayor J. Palmer Gaillard, Jr. ran for the Democratic nomination
for Congress in February and lost. Meanwhile, Charleston physician, Dr. James

Edwards, ran for the Republican nomination for Congress. Many City of
Charleston voters who normally vote in the Democratic primary for Mayor
voted for Edwards in the Republican Congressional primary. No serious
Republican opposition has ever been offered in the mayoral race in Charleston.
Thus, the Democratic primary is the "meaningful election" under the Smith v.
Allwright reasoning. The Court might have applied the Smith v. Allwright

"meaningful election" doctrine, but it did not choose to do so.
49. 24 S.C. CoDE ANN. §345, 376, 383 and 400.2 et seq. (1962 and Supp.

1970).
50. "Courts should sustain, and administrative officials may apply, that
part of the statute which is constitutional, if such can be done without violating
completely the legislative purpose." Gordon v. Executive Committee, 335 F.

Supp. 166, 169 (D.S.C. 1971).
51. Id.
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to select candidates for the same major office. Apparently
the state has a "compelling interest" in preventing a voter
from voting in all primaries, that is, both primaries for the
same office. The court did not describe this "compelling interest" or offer any reasons why such a minimum protection
should be left the traditional primary system.
V.

CONCLUSION

The immediate effect of the Gordon decision in South
Carolina will probably be minimal, because the oath statute
did not completely prevent short term party switching anyway. It may have some effect, insofar as black voters will
now not have to fear voting outside the Democratic party
in particularly strategic elections and returning at a more
convenient or strategic time. Similarly, conservative voters
may keep a foothold in both the Republican and Democratic
parties by selective primary voting. In short, the decision
will probably contribute to the general shifting of party
loyalties from office to office and election to election.
The impact of Gordon is not in its immediate context,
however, but in the wider area of federal regulation of primaries in general. Applying Gordon to other states may result
in political chaos, as the majority of states have gone to
greater lengths than South Carolina to protect against primary raiding. 52 Gordon is a blow at the party system in favor
of greater flexibility on the part of the voter, who may now
claim a constitutional right to change parties at least once
every six months. 53
52. For a fuller discussion of the anti-raiding statute, see Note, The Con.stitutionality of Anti-Fuision and Party-Raiding Statutes, 47 COL. L. REV. 1207
(1947) and Mitau, Judicial Determination of Political Party Organizational
Autoiomy, 42 MINN. L REV. 245 (1957).
53. The United States Supreme Court has never faced this issue, and no
appeal was taken from the Gordon three-judge court to the Supreme Court. In
a related case, Lippitt v. Cipollone, 40 U.S.L.W. 3340 (U.S. Jan. 18, 1972), the
Supreme Court affirmed a District Court's decision which held that a candidate
might be prevented by a state statute from running in a primary if he has
recently changed parties to do so. The Ohio statute held that "[n]o person
shall be a candidate for nomination or election at a party primary if he voted
as a member of a different political party at any primary election within the next
preceding four calendar years." OHIo Ray. CoDE §3517.013 et seq. (Page Supp..
1970).
The lower court in Lippitt held that the state had a compelling interest in
protecting the integrity of political parties in this fashion.
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Gordon may be open to serious attack on its application
of the "compelling state interest" standard. The State of
South Carolina did not participate in the hearing or present
a brief on behalf of the statute's constitutionality. (The
Plaintiffs, of course, defended the statute's constitutionality
in response to questions from the bench.) Merely stating that
no "compelling purpose can possibly justify -locking' a citizen
into a party... for a full year" is not proving it. Most states
feel that they have a compelling interest in preserving the
party system as a functioning nominating and election process. If anti-raiding statutes are held unconstitutional because
of the durational requirements, raiding may go unchecked
to the eventual detriment of the electoral process and freedom
of the ballot. The constitutional broadening of the vote may
go too far and hamper the legislative attempt, through the
Voting Rights Act, to prevent unfair dilution of a party's
or race's or faction's vote.
Gordon has applied a sound doctrine to an area which is,
at best, difficult to predict. It would seem that a citizen does
have a constitutional right to change parties whenever he
pleases. If he does not, then, for that period of time during
which the voter cannot change parties, he has effectively lost
his right to vote.
ROBERT ROSEN

Four Supreme Court justices dissented from the affirmance (handed down
without oral argument) : Justices Brennan, Douglas, White, and Powell. Mr.
Justice Douglas wrote a dissenting opinion to the affirmance in which he said,
in part: "Not only does the denial of appellant's right to seek the nomination . . .seriously impair his right of political expression, but the 'compelling
state interest' advanced by the appellees and accepted by the court below seems
alien to our political and constitutional heritage. The right to run for public
office seems a fundamental one."
Thus in Lippitt the Supreme Court was not faced with a Voting Rights
Act problem, nor with the right to vote. The disciplining of a candidate, to
insure party regularity, may be a "compelling state interest," whereas preventing a voter from voting is not.
With Lippitt affirmed by an obviously divided Court, and with Gordon left
unappealed, it remains to be seen what direction the Supreme Court will take
on the right to change parties.
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